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Abstract
Amodern economy is an intricately linked web of specialized production units, each relying
on the ow of inputs from their suppliers to produce their own output which, in turn, is
routed towards other downstream units. In this essay, I argue that this network perpective
on production linkages can o¤er novel insights on the sources of aggregate uctuations.
To do this, I show (i) how production networks can be mapped to a standard general
equilibrium setup; (ii) how to approach input-output from this networked perspective and
(iii) how theory and data on production networks can be usefuly combined to shed light
on comovement and aggregate uctuations.
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1 Introduction
A modern economy is an intricately linked web of specialized production units, each relying on
the ow of inputs from their suppliers to produce their own output which, in turn, is routed
towards other downstream units. In this essay I argue that the structure of this production net-
work is key in determining whether and how microeconomic shocks - a¤ecting only a particular
rm or technology along the chain - propagate throughout the economy and shape aggregate
outcomes. For this reason, understanding the structure of this production network can better
inform both academics on the origins of aggregate uctuations and policy-makers on how to
prepare for and recover from adverse shocks that disrupt these production chains.
Two recent events have brought to the forefront the importance of interconnections between
rms and sectors in aggregate economic performance. Consider rst the 2011 earthquake in
Japan. While the triple tragedy of the earthquake, the ensuing tsunami and the near nuclear
meltdown at Fukushima surely resulted in a signicant destruction of human and physical
capital, its e¤ects would have been largely restricted to the a¤ected areas were it not for the
disruption of national and global supply chains that it entailed. As Kim and Reynolds (2011)
reported for Reuters in the aftermath of the earthquake:
Supply chain disruptions in Japan have forced at least one global automaker
to delay the launch of two new models and are forcing other industries to shutter
plants (. . . ) The automaker is just one of dozens, if not hundreds, of Japanese
manufacturers facing disruptions to their supply chains as a result of the quake, the
subsequent tsunami and a still-unresolved nuclear threat.
On a grander scale, the nancial crisis, the 2007-2009 recession and its aftermath, have
brought with them a renewed emphasis on the complex web of linkages which constitute the
backbone of the U.S. economy. Terms like too interconnected to failor systemically impor-
tant rmshave become commonplace in public discourse. While this network lingo originated
in the connes of an intertwined nancial sector, it is increasingly used to describe the trans-
mission of disturbances across individual actors in the economy. One prime example is the
reasoning o¤ered in the congressional testimony of Fords C.E.O., Alan Mullaly (2008), when
requesting the government to bail out Fords key competitors, G.M. and Chrysler:
If any one of the domestic companies should fail, we believe there is a strong
chance that the entire industry would face severe disruption. Ours is in some signif-
icant ways an industry that is uniquely interdependent  particularly with respect
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to our supply base, with more than 90 percent commonality among our suppliers.
Should one of the other domestic companies declare bankruptcy, the e¤ect on Fords
production operations would be felt within days  if not hours. Suppliers could not
get nancing and would stop shipments to customers. Without parts for the just-in-
time inventory system, Ford plants would not be able to produce vehicles.(Mullaly,
2008)
The common theme across these two examples is that the organization of production along
supply chain networks exposes the aggregate economy to disruptions in critical nodes in these
chains. In particular, whenever the linkage structure in the economy is dominated by a small
number of hubs supplying inputs to many di¤erent rms or sectors aggregate uctuations
may obtain for two related, but distinct, reasons. First, uctuations in these hub-like production
units can propagate throughout the economy and a¤ect aggregate performance, much in the
same way as a shutdown at a major airport has a disruptive impact on all scheduled ights
throughout a country. In either case, there are no close substitutes in the short run and every
user is a¤ected by disturbances at the source. Second, the presence of these hubs provides
shortcuts through which these supply chain networks become easily navigable. That is, hubs
shorten distances between otherwise disparate parts of the economy that do not directly trade
inputs. The upshot of this is that these production hubs act as powerful shock conductors,
helping to transmit shocks originating elsewhere in the network.
In this essay, I argue that these production networks, by facilitating the propagation of
otherwise localized disturbances, provide a bridge between the micro - the myriad of unforeseen
events a¤ecting individual production decisions and the macro their synchronized behaviour
which denes the business cycle.
This synchronization of production decisions over time has led most of modern macroeco-
nomics to assume the presence of some sort of aggregate shock, at times lifting all boats, at
times generating widespread recessions. In doing so however, modern business cycle theory has
assumed rather than explained comovement across producers from the outset. Moreover,
after decades of research, the origins of these aggregate shocks remain elusive thus casting doubt
on their assumed existence. Against this backdrop, the promise of production networks is to
open the black-box of comovement by viewing it as the endogenous outcome of micro shocks
propagating across input linkages.
To do this, I will begin by showing how this novel view can be easily mapped to a standard
multi-sector general equilibrium setting where di¤erent sectors are interlinked by input-output
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relations. In particular, through a series of stylized examples, I will explore how the propagation
of sectoral shocks  and hence aggregate volatility - depends on di¤erent arrangements of
production, i.e. di¤erent shapesof the underlying production network.
The natural follow-up question that I take on in this paper is whether we can discipline the
set of admissible shapesby looking at actual data on production networks. I will do this by
exploring - from a network perspective - the empirical properties of a large scale production
network as given by U.S. detailed input-output data.
Given the properties we observe in the data, I then use the model to ask a range of questions:
Is the organization of the economy along production networks a source of aggregate uctuations?
Can we understand empirical patterns of sectoral comovement through this lens? Is the level
of sectoral comovement a function of how far apart the di¤erent sectors are in the production
network? Do central sectors in the production network comove more with the aggregate? In
short, can traditional tools of network analysis - such as distance across nodes or centrality of
a given node - help us further our understanding of what shapes comovement?
Finally, I show that the structure of the production network - and the strength of the
propagation mechanism it entails - is crucial when confronting a deep-seated and inuential
logic which, till this day, justies the continued appeal to an exogenous synchronization device,
in the form of aggregate shocks. This argument, dating back at least to Lucas (1977), goes
as follows: given that uncorrelated micro disturbances, by denition, occur randomly across
production nodes, wont these micro-shocks tend to average out as we disaggregate the economy
into ner and ner denitions of what a production unit is? In other words, wont these local
disturbances tend to be diversied away? In turn, doesnt this imply that we cannot dispense
with aggregate shocks? By bringing theory and empirics together I will argue that the answer
to these questions is a likely no.
2 A simple model of production networks
I start by showing how these production networks can be mapped into a basic general equi-
librium setting - a static variant of a textbook multi-sector model without aggregate shocks,
following closely in the footsteps of Acemoglu et al. (2012). I then discuss how di¤erent ways of
organizing these production networks can generate di¤erent magnitudes of aggregate volatility.
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2.1 Networks of input ows: a general equilibrium benchmark
Consider an economy where production takes place at n distinct nodes, each specializing in a
di¤erent good. These goods serve a dual role in the economy: on the one hand, each good is
potentially valued by households as nal consumption; on the other hand, the very same good
can be used as an intermediate input to be deployed in the production of other goods. Here I
will focus on this latter role and simplify the nal demand side of this economy substantially
by assuming that households value the di¤erent goods equally and, as a consequence, consume
them in equal proportions. In the same spirit, I will assume households provide labor services
inelastically to the goodsproducers in the economy and spend all the resulting wage income
in the consumption of the n goods.1
A natural interpretation for these production nodes is to equate them with the di¤erent
sectors of an economy. I assume that the production process at each of these sectors is well
approximated by a Cobb-Douglas technology with constant returns to scale, combining a pri-
mary factor which in this case is labor and intermediate inputs. The output of sector i is
then given by:
xi = (zili)
1 
 
nY
x
!ij
ij
i=1
!
In this Cobb-Douglas production function, the rst term shows the contribution from pri-
mary factors to production. The amount of labor hired by sector i is given by li, while 1  is the
share of labor in production. The added element in this rst term is zi, a sector-specic produc-
tivity disturbance, shifting the production possibilities frontier of sector i in a random fashion.
This is the only source of uncertainty in this simple economy. I assume further that these pro-
ductivity shocks are independent across producers of goods in the economy. The absence of any
exogenous correlating device that is, the lack of any aggregate technology shocks allows us
to focus solely on the question of interest: can interconnections across production technologies,
in the form of intermediate inputs ows, generate endogenous comovement across otherwise
unrelated producers of goods?
These interconnections between production nodes come into play with the second term of the
production function, which reects the contribution of intermediate inputs from other sectors.
Thus, the term xij denotes the amount of good j used in the production of good i. The exponent
1In other words, on the nal demand side I will be assuming that the representative household has a Cobb-
Douglas utility function with the same weights over the di¤erent goods and has no disutility of labor.
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!ij( 0) in the production function gives the share of good j in the total intermediate input use
by sector i2. For a given sector i, the associated list of !ijs thus encodes a sort of production
recipe. Each non-zero element of this list singles out a good that needs to be sourced in order
to produce good i. Whenever a !ij is zero we are simply stating that sector i cannot usefully
incorporate j as input in production, no matter what input prices sector i is currently facing.
Note further that all production technologies are, deliberately, being kept largely symmetric:
all goods are equally valued by nal consumers and all production technologies are equally
labor-intensive (i.e. they all share the same ).3 The only di¤erence across sectors then lies in
the bundle of intermediate inputs as specied by their production recipe that is, which goods
are necessary as inputs in the production process of other goods.
When we stack together all production recipes in the economy, we obtain a collection of n
lists, or rows, each row giving the particular list of !ij associated with the production technology
in sector i. This list-of-lists is nothing other than an input-output matrix, W , summarizing
the structure of intermediate input relations in this economy. Crucially for this paper, all
information in W can be equivalently represented by a network, something that has been
acknowledged at least since Solow (1952) but rarely put to use. The production network, W 
the central object of this essay is then dened by three elements: (i) a collection of n vertices
or nodes, each vertex of corresponding to one of the sectors in the economy, (ii) a collection of
directed edges, where an edge between any two vertices denotes an input-supplying relationship
between two sectors and (iii) a collection of weights, each of which is associated with a particular
directed edge and given by the exponent !ij in the production function.
The question is now whether di¤erent production networks, i.e. di¤erent arrangements
of who sources inputs from whom, matter for comovement and aggregate uctuations. An
initial clue is provided by the general equilibrium solution of the economy just described. In
equilibrium, (the logarithm of) aggregate value added, y, is simply a weighted sum of the
(logarithm of) micro-level productivity shocks, "i:
2I will further assume that these shares sum to one for any sector i. As a consequence of the Cobb-Douglas,
constant returns to scale, assumption and competitive factor markets, these shares are constant over time.
Anticipating the discussion below, they can be read o¤ the entries of input-output tables, measuring the value
of spending on input j as a share of total intermediate input purchases of sector i.
3Additionally, it should be stressed that by imposing a convenient, but nevertheless particular, Cobb-Douglas
structure to aggregate across intermediate inputs, I am also imposing a unit elasticity of substitution across
inputs. In reality, for any given technology, there will be some inputs that are crucial and di¢ cult to substitute
away from, even if their price rises substantially think fresh sh for sushi restaurants in Japan in the aftermath
of the Fukushima disaster and the ensuing contamination scare while others would seem more substitutable
advertising seems like a prime example. Unfortunately, at least at very disaggregated levels, we have little
evidence regarding the likely range of these elasticities. At intermediate levels of aggregation e.g. two digit
industries - Atalay (2014) provides evidence in favour of strong complementarity across intermediate inputs.
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y =
Xn
i=1
i"i
where the weights, vi, are determined by the production network,W 4. This characterization
has two important consequences: rst, aggregate output is itself random, i.e. we now have a
simple theory of why aggregate output might uctuate over time; second, the magnitude of
these aggregate uctuations can now be traced back to the production network, in particular,
how strongly the underlying network propagates micro-shocks across sectors, as encoded by the
weights vi.
To understand the specic propagation mechanism at play in this setting, it is perhaps useful
to go through a simple thought experiment. Imagine that a favourable productivity shock hits
one sector in the economy leaving the productivity of all others unchanged. To be concrete,
think for example of a major, unanticipated, breakthrough in the production technology of
semiconductors which decreases the marginal cost of production signicantly. Clearly, this
supply shock will increase the production and decrease the price of semiconductors. As a result
of this shock, the electronic components sector the key sector downstream of semiconductors-
also sees its marginal cost decline as one of its key inputs just became cheaper. Electronic
component producers will react to this by expanding production and decreasing their own
price. A second round of adjustment now ensues as the many sectors downstream of electronic
components  computers, precision machines or communication devices among many others
- adjust in the same way. As the original shock percolates further through the production
network, a cascade of adjustments is now under way. Ultimately, every sector that is directly
or indirectly - downstream of semiconductors will nd it optimal to increase production by
some amount, potentially leading to a synchronized expansion of economic activity across the
board.
4The competitive equilibrium solution of this basic model economy yields an expression for the logarithm of
aggregate value added (i.e. GDP), y, given by:
y = v0";
and
v =
(1  )
n
[I   W 0] 11
where 1 is a n1 vector of ones and " is a n1 vector of the (logarithm of) sector specic productivity shocks,
that is, "i  log(zi). Aggregate GDP, y, is a weighted sum of the underlying micro shocks and hence a random
variable itself. The n 1 vector v gives the appropriate weight to each sector. When a productivity shock hits
a given sector, all of the adjustments described in the main text are encapsulated in the term [I  W 0] 1. The
latter object is nothing other than the celebrated Leontief inversematrix of input-output analysis.
6
Figure 1: Three production networks on four nodes. From left to right: an horizontal economy
with no input trade, a vertical economy with a source and a sink and a star economy with a
central node.
Notice that an outside observer focusing solely on aggregate measurements of the economy
and ignoring the structure of intermediate input trade would conclude that a mysterious ag-
gregate productivity shock had just occurred, the source of which would necessarily be elusive.
In fact, only one of the many production technologies in this economy is now more produc-
tive. The comovement induced by this idiosyncratic shock is a feature of general equilibrium
adjustments working their way through the network of input linkages.
2.2 Three Variations on a Theme: Network Structure Matters
These cascading e¤ects via input-output linkages open the door to thinking about comovement
across sectors and aggregate uctuations without resorting to aggregate shocks. But whether
and how an idiosyncratic shock propagates across the economy via these linkages depends
critically on the way the production network is arranged.
To understand how the structure of production networks can matter for the volatility of
aggregate output I now show that di¤erent production networks imply di¤erent levels for the
volatility of aggregate output. Specically, I explore three variations on a four node economy,
by considering three di¤erent arrangements of an underlying production network, as depicted
in Figure 1. Each of these networks will imply a di¤erent strength for the models internal
propagation mechanism. These can be summarized by what I will call a network multiplier: by
how much the particular network structure of the economy amplies idiosyncratic volatility.
Consider rst the simplest baseline case: an empty network where there is no intermediate
input trade in the economy. In terms of the production function given earlier, all sectors use
only labor to produce the respective consumption good, and no sector provides intermediate
inputs to any other sector (that is, all !ij = 0 in the production function above). Following
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Bigio and LaO (2013), I dub this case the horizontal economy. In this economy, shocks to any
given sector will not a¤ect any other sector as the propagation mechanism described above is
mute. As such, there is no amplication of micro-level volatility and the network multiplier,mH ,
is equal to 1.5 If this example seems of little practical relevance, it is worth remembering that
this horizontal economy closely corresponds to the modelling of intermediate goods in most
of the macroeconomics literature. Typically, these models assume that intermediate goods
are produced with primary inputs alone  i.e. there are no ows across intermediate inputs
producers - and are then combined into a nal consumption good by a so-called nal good
aggregator.In our horizontal economy, the di¤erent consumption goods are combined into an
aggregate consumption bundle through the households utility function.
In the context of supply chains it is perhaps more intuitive to consider what Bigio and LaO
(2013) call a vertical economy, one in which inputs ow unidirectionally from a well-dened
upstream sector - think mining of rare earth minerals, for example - whose output is successively
transformed - magnets made from such minerals, which in turn are an input into speakers - and
ultimately incorporated in the nal downstream sector - your smartphone. In network parlance,
this is a tree or line structure with a single source (the upstream node, with no incoming links)
and a single sink (the downstream node, with no outgoing links).6 Just as in the horizontal
economy, shocks to each sectors productivity growth have a direct contribution to aggregate
output and hence on aggregate volatility. But because sectors are now interlinked, further
indirect contributions to aggregate volatility arise. For example, productivity uctuations at the
most upstream source (sector 1) to now have a rst-round e¤ect on its immediate downstream
customer sector 2; a smaller, second-round e¤ect on sector 3; and an even smaller, third round,
e¤ect on sector 4. The remaining three sectors contribute in a similar manner except for the fact
that they are closer to the sink node and hence do not contribute to aggregate volatility with
as many higher order indirect e¤ects. Taken together, the presence of these indirect e¤ects 
5In the horizontal economy, equilibrium aggregate output is given by y = (1 )n 
n
(i=1)"i (using the equa-
tion from the previous footnote). Given that, by assumption, there is no correlation in the productivity
shocks across technologies, the variance of aggregate output is simply 2y=
(1 )22"
4 mH , where mH , the net-
work multiplier associated to the horizontal economy, is equal to 1. In the vertical economy, aggregate
output volatility is now given by 2y=
(1 )22"
4 mV , where the network multiplier for this vertical economy is
mV =
[(1++2+3)2+(1++2)2+(1+)2+1]
4 . Clearly mV > mH for any positive share of intermediate inputs.
Aggregate output volatility in the star economy is equal to 2y=
(1 )22"
4 mS where the network multiplier is
now given by ms = [

3+1
1 2
2
+ 3

1+=3
1 2
2
]=4. Comparing expressions, it is straightforward to show that
mS > mV > mH .
6See Antras, Chor, Fally and Hillberry (2012) for a related discussion on how to extract upstreamness
measures from input-output data.
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absent in the horizontal economy implies that the production network amplies idiosyncratic
volatility leading to a network multiplier mV > mH = 1. This source-sink arrangement of the
production network also highlights the disproportionate role of uctuations occurring in more
central technologies. In this example, sector 1 is the main source of uctuations in the economy,
since every other sector in the economy is (directly or indirectly) downstream of it.
Finally, consider a more exotic conguration, in which a single general purpose technology
functions as a hub in the network, its output being used as the sole intermediate input of all
other sectors. Each of the other sectors are now populated by specialized input producers, each
of which is necessary for the general purpose technology to operate. Call this the star economy.
While necessarily stylized, this star economy captures an important feature of the input-output
data I analyse below, where general purpose inputs  real estate and construction, banking
and nance, energy sectors or various forms of information technologies emerge as hubs in
the production network. Perhaps not surprisingly, this particular shape of the production
network yields the highest volatility across the three example economies just described, i.e.
the associated network multiplier mS > mV > mH . This heightened volatility comes from two
sources. First, productivity uctuations in the hub sector now have a direct, rst-round, impact
on every sector in the economy. Second, despite the fact that the remaining technologies are now
peripheral, uctuations in these sectors now propagate to all other sectors, as a second-order
e¤ect through their e¤ect on the hub sector. Thus, hub technologies contribute to aggregate
volatility in two ways. First, and similarly to the source nodes in the vertical economy, hub
sectors act as an important source of shocks. However, in this star economy, a new role emerges:
hub sectors act also as an important conductor of shocks occurring elsewhere in the economy.
These three examples demonstrate the possibility that the particular shape of the production
network may have a bearing on aggregate volatility. But these are just a few out of the many
congurations possible, even in a highly stylized economy with only four nodes. What happens
when we take the number of nodes to be very large? How are we to choose among this rich menu
of possibilities? How can we summarize the relevant features of these production networks in
data? To make progress on these questions, it is necessary to take this network perspective to
data on disaggregated input ows.
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3 Mapping production networks to data
The empirical counterpart to a network of production technologies consisting of nodes that
represent di¤erent sectors and directed ows that capture input transactions between sectors is
given by input-output data. To investigate the network structure of sector-to-sector input ows,
I use the U.S. Bureau of Economic AnalysisCommodity-by-Commodity Direct Requirements
Detailed Tables. While the data is available from 1972 to 2002 (at ve-year intervals) here I only
make use of the 2002 vintage of this data. This breaks down the US economy into 417 sectors,
which I will take as nodes in the sectoral input-network. Each non-zero (i; j) entry is a directed
edge of this network that is, a ow of inputs from supplying sector j to customer i.7 It is worth
keeping in mind that the total dollar value of these ows is of the same order of magnitude
of aggregate GDP itself. While, for double counting reasons, these transactions do not show
up in GDP gures, a very large amount of resources are devoted yearly to intermediate-input
transactions.
For some of the empirical analysis below, I will be focusing only on properties of the extensive
margin of input trade across sectors. To do this I use only the binary information contained
in this input-output data that is, who sources inputs from whom and disregard the weights
associated to such input linkages. More specically, I only consider a link to be present if
the associated input transaction is above 1 percent of a sectors total input purchases. With
this threshold rule, I am discarding very small transactions between sectors and focusing on the
main components of the bill of goods necessary to the production of any given sector. Following
this rule, I account for about 80 percent of the total value of intermediate input trade in the
US economy in 2002. Whenever I bring in the intensive margin, I will be using all of the input
output data in share format. Again, note that these empirical input shares conveniently map
to the Cobb-Douglas coe¢ cients for intermediate goods in the production functions introduced
in the previous section. The 2002 matrix of all such intermediate input shares W02 = f!ijgni;j=1
is then the directed, weighted, network under scrutiny.
Figure 2 provides a network representation of the input-output data in 2002. Despite its
apparent complexity we can provide some order by focusing on some key statistics summarizing
7This constitutes the least coarse sectoral data available worldwide and underlies the network analysis in
Carvalho (2010) and Acemoglu, Carvalho, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2012). Input-output tables are available
for a large cross-section of countries at a considerably coarser level. In particular, the input-output accounts
from the STAN database (OECD) consist of 47 sectors and are benchmarked for 37 countries near the year
2000. Based on this data, Blöchl, Theis, Vega-Redondo, and Fisher (2011) and McNerney, Fath, and Silverberg
(2013) provide a cross-country comparative perspective on the network structure of intersectoral ows.
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Figure 2: The production network corresponding to U.S. input-output data in 2002. Each node
in the network corresponds to a sector in the 2002 input-output data. Each edge corresponds
to an input-supply relation between two sectors. Larger (red) nodes closer to the center of
the network represent sectors supplying inputs to many other sectors. The 1-10 labels give
the ranking 10 top input suppliers: Wholesale Trade (1), Real Estate (2), Electric Power
Generation and Distribution (3), Management of Companies and Enterprises (4), Iron and Steel
Mills (5), Depository Credit Intermediation (6), Petroleum Reneries (7), Nondepository Credit
Intermediation (8), Truck Transportation (9) and Advertising (10). Source: BEA, detailed
input-output table for 2002. The Figure is drawn with the software package Gephi.
this network. Thus, a rst-order characterization of this network is its sparsity or low density8:
there are only 5217 non-zero edges out of a possible 4172, yielding a network density of 0.03.
To put it another way: at this level of disaggregation, most sectors consist of very specialized
technologies that only supply inputs to a handful of other sectors. As a result, the number
of sectors supplied by the average sector that is, the average degree of this network is
relatively low at about 11 relative to the total number of sectors in the network.
8Network density is dened by the fraction of edges that are present in the network relative to the total
number of possible edges, n2. See, for example, Jackson (2008) for textbook denitions of this and other
network objects.
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3.1 The Small World of Production Networks
Looking more closely at the gure, another rst-order feature emerges: there is extensive het-
erogeneity across sectors in their role as input suppliers. In the data, highly specialized input
suppliers coexist alongside general purpose input suppliers, such as iron and steel mills, petro-
leum reneries or real estate, some of the hub-like sectors in Figure 2.
This heterogeneity along the input-supply margin can be conveniently summarized by look-
ing at another network object, its weighted outdegree distribution. Dene the weighted outde-
gree of a sector as djout =
Pn
i=1 !ij - that is, the sum over all the weights of the network in which
sector j appears as an input-supplying sector. This measure ranges from 0 if a sector does not
supply inputs to any other sectors, to n if a single sector is the sole input supplier of every
sector in the economy. According to this weighted measure, the typical input-supplier in the
data has a weighted outdegree of about 0.5. An average input-supplying technology according
to this metric would correspond, for example, to cutting tools manufacturing (with a weighted
outdegree of 0.45 and supplying 7 other sectors). Many smaller and more specialized input
suppliers can be found in the data (e.g. optical lens manufacturing with a weighted outdegree
of 0.09 and supplying 3 other sectors only) alongside a handful of general purpose sectors, sup-
plying inputs to many other technologies (e.g. iron and steel mills, with weighted outdegree of
5.5, supplying 100 other sectors).
Figure 3 reports the empirical distribution associated with the 2002 input output data. The
x-axis is the weighted outdegree for each sector, presented on a log scale. The y-axis (also
in log scale) gives the probability that a sector selected at random from the population has
an outdegree larger than or equal to x. Thus, the upper left-hand portion of the distribution
where specialized technologies like optical lens manufacturing are located - shows that about
100 percent of sectors have a weighted outdegree greater than 0.01; the middle portion of the
distribution shows that only about one-tenth of all sectors have an outdegree greater than 1;
and the right-hand side of the distribution where we nd general purpose technologies like
iron and steel mills or petroleum reneries - shows that only about 1 percent of all sectors have
a weighted outdegree measure greater than 5.
Clearly, the empirical distribution of weighted outdegree measures is skewed and spans
several orders of magnitude, reecting the very unequal status of di¤erent technologies in their
role as input suppliers. As in other instances where extreme inequality is rst order e.g. the
cross-section of incomes, city or rm sizes the right tail of this distribution is well approximated
by a so-called power law distribution. This kind of distribution implies a strong fat-tailed
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Figure 3: The empirical weighted outdegree distribution. The x -axis gives the weighted outde-
gree. The y-axis gives the probability of nding a sector with weighted outdegree larger than or
equal to x, i.e. the empirical counter-cumulative distribution (CCDF). Source: BEA, detailed
input-output table for 2002.
behaviour in that the probability of nding superstar technologies, far out in the right tail,
is large enough to render the variance of this distribution innite.9 The upshot of this is
that, even as we disaggregate the economy into ner and ner denitions of technologies, large
input-supplying sectors do not vanish.
The presence of this small number of hub-like sectors renders these input-output networks
into small and closely knitted worlds. In other words, despite the low density of sectoral
interactions despite the fact that most sectors do not trade with each other each sector is
only a few input-supply links away from most other sectors. In network parlance, these types
of networks are referred to as small world networks in which most nodes are not neighbors
of one another, but where most nodes can be reached from every other by a small number of
9The apparent linearity in the tail of the outdegree distribution when shown in log scales is usually associated
with a power law distribution. We say that the outdegree distribution follows a power-law if the associated
counter-cumulative probability distribution P (x) giving the probability of nding sectors with outdegree equal
to or greater than x is given by:
P (x) = cx  for  > 1 and x > 0;
where c is a positive constant and  is known as the tail index. A well-known property of this distribution is
that for 1 <  < 2, the outdegree distribution has diverging second (and above) moments. The straight line in
Figure 3 shows the maximum likelihood t implied by  = 1:44. See Gabaix (2009) for a review of power laws
and their applications in economics.
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hops or steps along the directed edges.
More precisely, in the network literature, small worlds are dened by appealing to two related
statistics: (i) the diameter of the network, dened as the maximum length of the shortest path,
i.e. the largest number of steps that separate sector i from sector j for all possible pairs of
sectors (i; j) and (ii) the average distance, dened as the average length of these shortest paths
for all pairs (i; j). When I apply these statistics to the detailed input-output data, I obtain a
low diameter (relative to 417, the total number of sectors) of 10 and a small average distance
of 4, thus conrming the small world nature of the U.S. production network.
The small-world property has obvious implications for the dynamics of processes taking
place on networks. In the context of social networks, if it takes only six steps for a rumor to
spread from any person to any other in society, then a rumor will likely spread much faster
than if it takes 100 steps. Similarly, as I will argue further below, if one considers the e¤ect
of a production disturbance, shutdown or default, to a specic rm or technology, the small-
world e¤ect implies that the original shock will spread quickly to most sectors thus a¤ecting
the performance of the aggregate economy.
3.2 Searching for Central Nodes in the Production Network
Until now I have focused attention on key technologies as dened by their weighted outdegree
ranking. These superstar technologies are certainly important both as a sources of volatility
and when propagating shocks occurring in other sectors. However, a sector can be key in other
ways. For example, consider a sector that looks average by its weighted outdegree ranking, but
that nevertheless is a key input supplier to a widely used general purpose technology. Despite
the fact that the immediate customers downstream of this sector are few, indirectly through
the downstream hub many production processes can potentially be a¤ected by disturbances
in the specialized upstream node.10
Identifying the central input-supplying technologies and ranking their roles in an economy
requires applying an appropriate measure of node centralityto the production network. While
network analysis has developed a variety of centrality measures, here I will focus on so-called
inuence measures of centrality, where nodes are considered to be relatively more central
in the network if their neighbors are themselves well-connected nodes. The best known of
these recursively dened centrality measures is called eigenvector centrality. Variants of
10Much in the same way as the impact of an academic article need not be evaluated by its citation count
alone but also by the impact of the (downstream) articles citing it.
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Figure 4: The empirical distribution of sector centralities. On the x-axis is the Bonacich
centrality score of the di¤erent sectors in the 2002 input-output data, where I have imposed
a baseline centrality measure of  = (1  0:5)=417 and a parameter for weighting downstream
sectors of  = 0:5. The y-axis gives probability of nding a sector with centrality score larger
than or equal to x, i.e. the empirical counter-cumulative distribution (CCDF). Source: BEA,
detailed input-output tables for 2002.
it have been deployed in the sociology literature, notably Bonacich (1972) and Katz (1953),
in computer science with Googles PageRank algorithm (Brin and Page 1998), or in social
networks literature within economics (for example, Ballester et al. 2006). In our setting the
Katz-Bonacich measure assigns, to each sector, a centrality score that is the sum of some baseline
centrality level (equal across sectors), and the centrality score of each of its downstream sectors,
dened in the same way.11 Thus, as in the example above, a sectors centrality need not be
dictated by its outdegree alone, but will also be determined by its customersoutdegree, its
customerscustomersoutdegree, ad innitum.
Remarkably, the sector-centrality scores obtained in this way coincide, exactly, with the
11To derive the KatzBonacich eigenvector centrality measure in our setting consider assigning, to each sector
j, a centrality weight cj > 0, which is dened by some baseline centrality level , equal across all sectors,
plus a term which is proportional to the weighted sum of the centrality weights of its downstream sectors:
cj = iWijci + , for some parameter  > 0. In matrix form, c = W 0c+ 1, where W is the
matrix representation of our production network, 1 is a vector of ones, and c is the vector of centrality
scores, cjs. This implies that the vector of centralities is given by:
c = (I   W 0) 11
Recalling the expression for equilibrium log GDP in the basic model, the vector c is nothing but the vector
of KatzBonacich centralities given an input-output network W where we restrict  = 1 n ,  =  (and where
 was the share of intermediate inputs in production).
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sector-specic weights, i, appearing in the expression for equilibrium aggregate output ob-
tained in the previous section. As a result, aggregate growth and volatility in our simple
multisector model now depends on a well-dened network object: the collection of network
centralities of the di¤erent production technologies. Intuitively, more central production tech-
nologies in the production network - those having more direct or indirect downstream customers
- are relatively more important in determining aggregate volatility.
On the x-axis is the (Bonacich) measure of centrality of sectors in the 2002 input-output
data. The y-axis gives probability of nding a sector with centrality score larger than or equal
to x. Thus, 100 percent of the sectors have a centrality measure that is greater than or equal
to the most peripheral node in the network hunting and trapping with a centrality score of
0.001; about 10 percent of the sectors in the network have a centrality measure greater than
0.004, that of warehousing and storage; and only about 1 percent have a centrality measure
greater 0.01, that of truck transportation.
As in the outdegree distribution, there is large variation in the network centrality of di¤erent
nodes, again in the form of a power-law distribution.12 Far out in the right tail, we nd the
central production nodes in the network. Through the lenses of our model, sectors such as real
estate, management of companies and enterprises, advertising, wholesale trade, telecommunica-
tions, iron and steel mills, truck transportation, and depository credit intermediation alongside
a variety of energy related sectors - petroleum reneries, oil and gas extraction and electric
power generation and distribution - are seemingly key to US aggregate volatility as they sit at
the center of the production network.13
4 Production Networks, Comovement and Aggregate Fluc-
tuations
Our model production networks stresses the role of input-supply linkages: an idiosyncratic
shock a¤ecting a single sector will be transmitted to its downstream neighbours in the network
and, via the latter, propagate further downstream to other production nodes only indirectly
12As discussed in note 9, with regard to Figure 3, the straight line plotted in the gure gives the power-law
t to this data, with a tail parameter  = 1:48:
13Clearly, many of these sectors are the superstar sectors that also rank high according to the outdegree
measure. Accordingly, the rank correlation between centrality and outdegree is a very high 0.95. Nevertheless,
there are sectors that change their ranking substantially. Oil and gas extraction, together with other mining
activities such as coal, provide the best examples of highly central sectors in the network that are nevertheless
middling according to their weighted outdegree measure. This is because they are key suppliers of downstream
general purpose technologies such as petroleum reneries or electric power generation.
16
connected with the original sector. Does this model generate testable implications? Can this
network perspective shed new light on the comovement patterns at the heart of business cycle
uctuations?
4.1 Networked Perspectives on Comovement
Comovement across sectors is the hallmark of cyclical uctuations. As stressed throughout this
essay, from a production networks perspective, comovement is endogenous: synchronization
arises from micro shocks propagating across input linkages. Importantly, this perspective also
implies that a very particular pattern of comovement should hold in the data. To see this note
that, as an original sectoral shock to productivity makes its way downstream, its e¤ect should
weaken. Intuitively, a shock generating a given response in the output and price of the original
input-supplying sector will generate more muted responses further downstream as that input
is a smaller part of the total input bill of these sectors. Thus, two sectors which are closer in
terms of their network distance should comove more.
To test this hypothesis, I compute sector-level (real) value added growth rates from the
NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry database containing information for 459 four-digit SIC
manufacturing sectors for the period 1958-2009. For each pair of sectors, I then compute the
respective pair-wise correlation of growth rates over the entire sample period and correlate it
against the measure of network distance in the previous section, which I calculate from the
1987 detailed input-output matrix, choosing this date to represent roughly a midpoint of the
data.14
In Figure 5, the x-axis gives the network distance across any pair of sectors. The y-axis gives
the average correlation of sectoral output growth across all sector pairsat a given distance in the
production network. Clearly, sectors that are closer in the production network do comove more.
Across all pairs of sectors that directly trade inputs, the average annual growth rate correlation
is 0.32. Conversely, for pairs of sectors that are very distant in the network, the average
correlation is only around 0.1. Another way to relate network distance and comovement is to
look at averages in the population. Across all sector pairs, the average growth rate correlation
in the data is 0.21. This is strikingly close to the average growth rate correlation between
sectors that are four links away, the average distance in the network.
From the vantage point of production networks this is no coincidence: the average level of
14The 1987 input-output data disaggregates the economy into 510 sectors. The concordance between this
input-output table and the NBER database, which only covers manufacturing sectors, is the one used in Holly
and Petrella (2012), which I gratefully acknowledge.
17
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
Network Distance
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
of
 S
ec
to
ra
l O
ut
pu
t G
ro
w
th
Figure 5: Network distance and comovement. The x-axis gives the network distance across any
pair of sectors. The y-axis gives the average correlation of sectoral output growth across all
sector pairsat a given distance in the production network. Source: NBER-CES manufacturing
database and BEA detailed input-output tables for 1987.
sectoral comovement in the data - and hence aggregate volatility - is in fact implied by a short
average distance in our small world of production networks. Were the production network to
be arranged in some other way - thus altering its shock conducting properties - the average
level of comovement would change accordingly.
Note that it would be very di¢ cult to rationalize this feature of comovement across sectors
in a setup with aggregate shocks alone. First, were all sectors to respond equally to some
exogenous aggregate pulse, Figure 5 should simply display a horizontal line, i.e. comovement
should not vary systematically with network distance. Alternatively, if we were to assume that
sectors have di¤erent sensitivities to this aggregate shock, the only way to generate a similar
pattern to the one observed in the data would be to impose in addition a condition that sectors
tend to source inputs from similarly sensitive sectors. It is unclear what could justify this
very strong assumption. In contrast, the empirical relation between comovement and network
distance observed in the data is an immediate implication of our standard general equilibrium
model of production networks.
As argued earlier, low average distances between sectors are a consequence of hubs that
is, the existence of general purpose inputs that shorten the path between otherwise disparate
technologies. These hubs are, by denition, central nodes in the production network, only a
short distance away from the majority of sectors. As such, by the same network distance-
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Figure 6: Comovement of productivity growth in central sectors and aggregate output growth.
Solid (blue) line gives manufacturing real value added growth for the period 1959-2009. Dashed
(red) line gives the simple average of total factor productivity growth across the ten most
central sectors in the production network. Source: NBER-CES manufacturing database and
BEA detailed input-output tables for 1987.
comovement argument, they should comove more with all sectors in the economy and hence
with aggregates. Additionally, the presence of these hubs will also render other sectors in the
economythose supplying the inputs on which the hubs rely more central. The upshot of
this is that productivity uctuations in these very central technologies in the network - those
having more (direct or indirect) downstream customers - should be relatively more correlated
with aggregate output growth.
I again resort to the NBER manufacturing data and to the 1987 input-output data to assess
the validity of this prediction. I use the former to aggregate sectoral growth rates and derive a
time series of aggregate manufacturing real growth in value added. I use the input-output data
to calculate the measure of (Bonacich) network centrality discussed in the previous section -
for each manufacturing sector.15 As a proxy for productivity uctuations occurring in central
nodes, I take the simple average of total factor productivity growth across the ten most central
sectors in the production network.
Figure 6 plots the resulting series for (aggregate) manufacturing value added growth and
our index of productivity uctuations in the ten most central technologies, for the period 1959-
2009. Clearly, the two series track each other very closely. Over the entire sample period the
15For the centrality calculation, I pick  = 0:5, the average share of intermediate inputs in gross output, and
n = 459, the total number of sectors.
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coe¢ cient of correlation 0.80 and highly signicant. As our network perspective predicts, this
correlation is much higher than that obtaining for the average centrality sector in the economy
(0.29). From an applied perspective, this suggests that analysts and policy-makers looking
to predict the short-run behaviour of macroeconomic aggregates could benet from tracking
economic activity in only a handful of central or systemic sectors.
Several concerns can be raised about this calculation. First, perhaps causality runs the
other way: not from key sectors to aggregate economic performance as a networked perspective
implies, but instead from aggregate shocks a¤ecting key sectors disproportionately. For this
to be the case, productivity in relatively more central technologies would need to be more
cyclically sensitive. While it is a priori unclear why "cyclical sensitivity" should correlate with
this very particular and non-obvious network centrality measure, this identication problem
has not been conclusively dealt with in the literature.
An alternative critique is that this correlation simply reects an underlying accounting
identity and contains no economic meaning beyond that. After all, high centrality sectors are
likely among the larger sectors in the economy. Hence movements in economic activity in these
large sectors, for which productivity might be acting as a proxy, would mechanically translate
into movement in aggregates. If this critique is valid, were we to remove the contribution of
these key sectors to aggregate growth, we should then observe a much lower correlation between
productivity growth in high centrality nodes and aggregate output growth. This can be easily
tested by constructing a counterfactual aggregate manufacturing output growth series where
we zero out the contribution of the ten most central technologies. Reassuringly, the correlation
between this counterfactual aggregate series and our index of productivity uctuations in these
ten most central technologies is still a very high 0.76. This is consistent with our network
perspective: hub sectors are important sources of aggregate uctuations not because they are
large but because they synchronize economic activity across the board.
4.2 Confronting Lucas(other) Critique
While promising as a way to understand the origins of comovement and aggregate uctuations,
a skeptic might still reasonably argue that all the intuition and results above are just a gment
of aggregation. Surely, as we disaggregate the economy into ner and ner sectors, independent
disturbances across nodes will tend to average out, leaving aggregates unchanged thus yielding
a weak propagation mechanism. In fact, this "diversication" argument has a distinguished
pedigree in macroeconomics and was invoked, for example, by Lucas (1977) to do away with
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the entire outlook proposed in these pages:
In a complex modern economy, there will be a large number of such shifts in
any given period, each small in importance relative to total output. There will be
much averaging outof such e¤ects across markets. Cancellation of this sort is, I
think, the most important reason why one cannot seek an explanation of the general
movements we call business cycles in the mere presence, per se, of unpredictability
of conditions in individual markets.
This intuitive yet powerful indictment has been playing out over the years in the modern
equilibrium business cycle literature and underlies much of its continued appeal to aggregate
taste shifters or technology shocks. Can a production network perspective undo this argument?
How does aggregate volatility behave when we take the number of nodes in the production
network to be very large - as it surely is in the economy - while keeping the assumption of no
aggregate shocks?
We can certainly recreate Lucas"diversication" argument in our networked economy. To
see it at play, recall the horizontal economy example introduced above. From that discussion
it is immediate that, for a generic number of sectors, n, aggregate volatility in horizontal
economies, y is of the order of magnitude of "pn . That is, as we disaggregate the horizontal
economy further, into more and more production nodes, aggregate volatility declines to zero at
very rapid rate of
p
n. This implies that, holding micro-volatility (") xed, as we move from
an economy populated by 100 sectors to one with, say, 10000 sectors, the implied standard
deviation of aggregate GDP will be an order of magnitude lower.
However, the network perspective on input ow data renders clear what is wrong with this
argument: the U.S. economy looks nothing like a horizontal economy where intermediate input
producers exist in isolation of each other. Instead, the production of each good in the economy
relies on a complex set of linkages across sectors. As we have seen these linkages function
as a potential propagation mechanism of idiosyncratic shocks throughout the economy. How
strong is this propagation mechanism once we take on board empirical properties of production
networks? How strong is the multiplier associated with the actual U.S. production network?
To answer this question we need two ingredients. First, recall that generically the aggregate
volatility is a function of the centrality scores of the di¤erent technologies in the U.S. production
network. Second, as we have seen, there is extensive heterogeneity in these centrality scores: a
relatively small number of hub-like sectors are far more central than the vast majority of nodes
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in the production network. Based on these two observations, it is possible to show16 that, for
empirically relevant production networks, aggregate volatility is of the order of magnitude of
"
n(1 1=) rather than
"p
n
, where  is nothing else than the slope of the centrality score distribution
in Figure 4. This parameter governs the degree of inequalityin this distribution: the more
unequal is this distribution - i.e. the more important is the role of a few central input-suppliers
in the network the closer is  to 1. The upshot of this is that, in a world where superstar
technologies act as powerful shock conductors, aggregate volatility decays much more slowly
with the number of sectors, rendering Lucasdiversication arguments second order.
To understand the power of this seemingly abstruse distinction, consider the following back-
of-the-envelope calculation. From the NBER manufacturing data, the standard deviation of
total factor productivity growth for a typical narrowly dened sector is 0.06. For, say, 500
sectors, the horizontal economy would then imply aggregate volatility of the order of magnitude
of 0.003, a non-starter as a theory of the aggregate business cycle as Lucas had argued. Instead,
given the estimates for  = 1:4 in Section 3, our theory of production networks now implies non-
negligible aggregate volatility of the order of 0.01. In a nutshell, sizeable aggregate uctuations
may originate from microeconomic shocks once salient characteristics of the production network
are incorporated into the analysis.
Taken together, the networked structure of production is consistent with distinctive pat-
terns of comovement in the data and opens the way for a deeper understanding of the sources
of aggregate uctuations without resorting to convenient, but ultimately elusive, aggregate
shocks.17
16Under the assumption of idiosyncratic shocks, aggregate volatility in our simple model of production net-
works is given by:
y = "
q
(ni=1
2
i )
where i is the centrality of node i in the production network. Based on a power law distribution of centrality
scores, it is possible to show, by applying Gabaixs (2011) theorem (on the asymptotic behaviour of sums
of independent random variables with power law weights) that, for the empirically relevant fat-tailed regime
(1 <  < 2) aggregate volatility is of the order of magnitude of "
n1 1=" rather than
"p
n
.
17These conclusions are related to and reinforce the results of an earlier strand of the literature on cascading
behavior in production networks. One of the early papers is due to Bak, Chen, Scheinkman and Woodford
(1993) where the authors describe the distribution of production avalanches triggered by random independent
demand events. See also Jovanovic (1987) for a notable antecedent to this line of research and LaO (2013) for
a thought provoking follow-up. These di¤erent contributions are not based on an empirical description of the
network structure, but instead assume very simple interaction structures across agents, such as circle networks
or periodic lattices.
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5 Looking Ahead
Viewing the economy as a complex production network may seem, at least at rst hearing, as
yet another fuzzy analogy coated in big words. In this essay, I have attempted to show that
this perspective can indeed o¤er testable hypotheses and insights by mapping it to a standard
general equilibrium setup and showing how this provides guidance for empirical explorations
of input-output data. Looking at sectoral comovement from this vantage point, I have shown
that the immediate implications of this networked perspective cannot be reasonably refuted.
Furthermore, as I have discussed, theory and empirics together provide a challenge to a long
standing "irrelevance" indictment in the literature. To go beyond these suggestive possibility
results, a small but fast expanding literature on production networks is hard at work on a
number of important challenges.
First, while throughout this essay I have kept equating nodes to sectors, input sourcing
decisions actually take place at the level of the plant or of the rm. The question therefore
concerns what constitutes the relevant node: rms, sectors or both? Relative to sectors, progress
on rm-level production networks needs to deal with three added complications. First, on the
theory side, it is more di¢ cult to brush aside the complexities of market structure (as I have
done here by appealing to identical, perfectly competitive rms inside each sector). Second, at
this level of disaggregation it is clear that we have to distinguish between easily substitutable
inputs and crucial, hard-to-substitute, inputs where rms are locked-in and switching costs are
large. Third, relative to sector-level data, input-output information at the rm-level is in very
short supply. Recent advances in developing a theory of rm-level networks (Obereld 2013)
and the availability of novel data sources provide important rst steps in this direction: for
examples, see Bernard et al. (2014) and Carvalho et al. (2014) for data on Japan and Atalay
et al. (2011) for US data.18
Second, the quantication and empirical validation of the network viewpoint is another
active area of research. Working with calibrated dynamic extensions of the simple multi-sector
model set forth here, Carvalho (2010) and Atalay (2014) nd a far from negligible role for
idiosyncratic shocks, echoing the earlier ndings of Horvath (1999). The results in Carvalho and
Gabaix (2013) regarding the dynamics of aggregate volatility, are consistent with these ndings
albeit working under a much simpler setting. Carvalho (2010) also generalizes the theoretical
18A burgeoning micro-literature on pricing and intermediation in networks can o¤er additional insights on
the theory side. For recent contributions in this area see, for example, Choi et al (2014), Kotowski and Leister
(2014), Manea (2014), and Nava (2013).
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ndings on the decay of aggregate volatility (discussed in the previous section of this essay) to
a class of dynamic multisector general equilibrium models. In another strand of the literature,
Foerster et al. (2011) and Holly and Petrella (2012), explore econometrically the equilibrium
structure of these models and conclude that input-output linkages serve as a powerful amplier
of otherwise independent shocks. At the rm-level, Kelly et al. (2013), di Giovanni et al.
(2014) and Carvalho et al. (2014) deploy a variety of methods  reduced-form correlations,
model-derived decompositions of aggregate volatility and natural experiments to argue that
the network structure of production matters quantitatively. Finally, the explicit incorporation of
the spatial dimension of these production networks i.e. acknowledging the uneven distribution
of production nodes across space holds the promise of both better understanding the mechanics
of shock propagation and of potentially isolating arguably exogenous shocks a¤ecting only small
parts of the network (see Caliendo et al. 2014 or Carvalho et al. 2014).
Third, production network considerations may have a bearing on other areas of research
in economics. Perhaps the most immediate candidate would be an open economy extension of
the setup considered here. Can co-movement across countries be the result of the international
transmission of shocks through global supply chain networks? The recent contributions of di
Giovanni and Levchenko (2010) and Johnson (2013) are encouraging early steps in this broad
direction, but there is still nearly everything to explore from a network perspective. Relatedly,
recent theoretical work on global supply chains and the network structure of international
trade can be another fruitful source of cross-talk on production networks (Antras and Chor
2013; Chaney 2013; Costinot et al. 2013).
In light of the recent nancial and economic crisis, another promising agenda is to look at
nancial frictions from a production network perspective. Despite the seminal contribution of
Kyotaki and Moore (1997) the possibility of cascading liquidity shocks in a network of producers
has been consistently overlooked. The recent work by Bigio and LaO (2013), showing that
production networks can serve as a powerful amplication mechanism for liquidity shocks,
represents an important step in this under-researched direction, but more remains to be done.
Finally, once one recognizes that network structure is linked to macroeconomic outcomes, a
more ambitious question emerges: what determines these structures? This requires developing
a theory where the network of input ows is the endogenous outcome of a well-dened economic
model. This research direction is virtually unexplored, although Obereld (2013) and Carvalho
and Voigtlaender (2014) o¤er some rst steps.
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